Tiger Woods

Marriage Record

State:

NEVADA

Type:

Marriage

Filing Number:

3874

County:

CLARK

Marriage Date:

11/12/2004

Party 1

Name:

CKRIDGE, CHRISTOPHER DAVID

Type:

GROOM

Address:

Party 2

Name:

MOQUIN, KALIKA GINA

Type:

BRIDE

Address:

Marriage Record

State:

NEVADA

Type:

Marriage

Filing Number:

534084

County:

CLARK

Marriage Date:

06/25/1983

Party 1

Name:

GRUBBS JR, GLENN WILEY

Type:

GROOM

Address:

Party 2

Name:

ETHRIDGE, LINDA K

Type:

BRIDE

Address:

The move to Windermere, Tiger Woods residence city, occurred in 2008

9378 PALM TREE DR, WINDERMERE FL 34786-8810

6032 PEREGRINE AVE, ORLANDO FL 32819-7520

622 OLYMPIC DR, OCOEE FL 34761-2853

200 AGNES CT APT 19, ORLANDO FL 32801-3834

9009 CHARLES E LIMPUS RD, ORLANDO FL 32836-5801

9321 LAKE LOTTA CIR, GOTHA FL 34734-5044

1209 S KIRKMAN RD APT 2133, ORLANDO FL 32811-2213

1209 S KIRKMAN RD APT 28, ORLANDO FL 32811-2633

41D NEW YORK APT 4, OGDENSBURG NY 13669

607 BARRE ST, OGDENSBURG NY 13669-2919

Divorce Record

State:

CALIFORNIA

Type:

Divorce

Filing Number:

357440

Divorce County:

LOS ANGELES

Divorce Gounds:

DIVORCE

Party 1

Name:

PRIDDLE, SEBASTIEN GUY

Type:

PLAINTIFF

Address:

Party 2

Name:

SAMPSON, HOLLY JOY

Type:

DEFENDANT

Address:

Debtor Information

Name:

SAMPSON,HOLLY

SSN:

527-49-XXXX

Address:

12800 MOORPARK ST APT 5
STUDIO CITY, CA 91604-1333
LOS ANGELES COUNTY

Creditor Information

Name:

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

Filing Information

Filing State:

CALIFORNIA

Filing Date:

10/19/2004

Amount:

$2,356

Filing 1

Filing Number:

20042692762

Filing Type:

STATE TAX LIEN

Filing Date:

10/19/2004

Filing Court:

LA COUNTY / RECORDER OF DEEDS

Filing County:

LOS ANGELES

Filing Office:

Address

4133 REDWOOD AVE UNIT 4003, LOS ANGELES CA 90066-5635

11049 MAGNOLIA BLVD APT 423, NORTH HOLLYWOOD CA 91601-5659

9882 WILDWOOD WAY, VILLA PARK CA 92861-3138

1950 CLOVERFIELD BLVD APT 10, SANTA MONICA CA 90404-4960

18382 SERRANO AVE, VILLA PARK CA 92861-2711

4163 VIA MARINA APT 308, MARINA DEL REY CA 90292-5325

1515 S FAIRFAX AVE, LOS ANGELES CA 90019-4945

6333 CANOGA AVE APT 119, WOODLAND HILLS CA 91367-7709

121 CATAMARAN ST, MARINA DEL REY CA 90292-5729

4310 GLENCOE AVE APT 10, MARINA DEL REY CA 90292-7608

223 HORIZON AVE APT 1, VENICE CA 90291-3786

12800 MOORPARK ST APT 5, STUDIO CITY CA 91604-1333

6029 LATIGO CANYON RD, MALIBU CA 90265-2819

2421 CLEMENT AVE, VENICE CA 90291-4748

13853 N 8TH PL APT 8, PHOENIX AZ 85022-4306

269 S BEVERLY DR APT 943, BEVERLY HILLS CA 90212-3851

4466 COLDWATER CANYON AVE, STUDIO CITY CA 91604-5018

843 SUNSET AVE APT C, PRESCOTT AZ 86305-1827

4530 WHITSETT AVE APT 4, STUDIO CITY CA 91604-1389

1729 BELOIT AVE APT 32, LOS ANGELES CA 90025-4262

1201 W VICTORY BLVD APT, BURBANK CA 91506-1437

502 S CHERRY AVE, TUCSON AZ 85719-6419

Divorce Record

State:

FLORIDA

Type:

Divorce

Filing Number:

035841

Divorce County:

BROWARD

Marriage Date:

01/22/2000

Divorce Date:

05/30/2006

Number of children:

Party 1

Name:

FIORAVANTI, DAVID

Type:

HUSBAND

Address:

FL
FL

Party 2

Name:

BRAUN, MICHELLE

Type:

WIFE

Address:

FL
FL

Where she Rogers has lived for the last 25 years

10325 TRIANON PL, WELLINGTON FL 33449-8071

230 SPRING PARK RANCH RD, CARBONDALE CO 81623-9583

10763 VERSAILLES BLVD, VILLAGE OF WELLINGTON FL 33449-8091

90 ALTON RD APT 3011, IAMI BEACH FL 33139-6707

255 W 88TH ST APT 2B, NEW YORK NY 10024-1717

2368 COUNTY ROAD 112 112 112, CARBONDALE CO 81623-9644

155 HOMESTEAD DR W, BASALT CO 81621

1770 DAYTONIA RD, MIAMI BEACH FL 33141-1735

161 RODEO DR, SNOWMASS VILLAGE CO 81615

100 E COOPER AVE APT, ASPEN CO 81611-1784

1140 SUNSET LN, CARBONDALE CO 81623-9791

205 S ANITA AVE APT 2, LOS ANGELES CA 90049-3803

12516 HIGH DR, LEAWOOD KS 66209-1341

205 2ND ANITA DR, LOS ANGELES CA 90049-3816

6466 BRECKENRIDGE CIR, LAKE WORTH FL 33467-6824

29500 HEATHERCLIFF RD APT, MALIBU CA 90265-4162

1779 WOOD RD, SNOWMASS VILLAGE CO 81615

205 2ND DR, LOS ANGELES CA 95049

8006 DUNFIELD AVE, LOS ANGELES CA 90045-1424

8302 S SEPULVEDA BLVD APT 326, LOS ANGELES CA 90045-2950

19 RIDGE, SNOWMASS VILLAGE CO 81615

7547 W MANCHESTER AVE APT, LOS ANGELES CA 90045-2352

ELDRICK "TIGER" WOODS, et al., Plaintiffs, vs. CHRISTENSEN SHIPYARDS, LTD., et al., Defendants.
CASE NO. 04-61432-CIV-ZLOCH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42994

September 23, 2005, Decided
September 23, 2005, Filed

COUNSEL: For ELDERICK "TIGER" WOODS, a Florida citizen, PRIVACY LTD., a Cayman Islands Corporation, Plaintiffs: Benedict Paul Kuehne, Jon A. Sale, Sale & Kuehne, Miami, FL; James Douglas Baldridge, Roger A. Colaizzi, Mary Ellen Himes, Danielle R. Foley, Maria Georges, Venable LLP, Washington, DC.

For CHRISTENSEN SHIPYARDS, LTD., a Washington Corporation, Defendant: Leslie Jean Lott, David Kenneth Friedland, Janet Cabral Moreira, Lott & Friedland, Coral Gables, FL; Phillip G. Marshall, English Lane Marshall Barrar, Stahnke & Vanderwood, Vancouver, WA; Michael S. Wampold, Jan Eric Peterson, Ann Rosato Heacox, Peterson Young Putra, Seattle, WA.

For ELIN NORDEGREN WOODS, a citizen of Sweden, Plaintiff: Benedict Paul Kuehne, Jon A. Sale, Sale & Kuehne, Miami, FL; Maria Georges, Venable LLP, Washington, DC.

For CAROL WILLIAMSON & ASSOCIATES, LTD., an Oregon Corporation, Defendant: Daniel Scott Mandel, Mandel Weisman Kirschner & Brodie, Boca Raton, FL; James Daniel Ennis, William Stuart Reese, Lane Reese Aulick Summers & Field, Douglas Center, Coral Gables, FL.

JUDGE: WILLIAM J. ZLOCH, Chief United States District Judge.

ORDER

THIS MATTER is before the Court upon Defendant Christensen Shipyards, Ltd. 's Motion To Dismiss For Improper Venue And To Dissolve Consent Preliminary Injunction (DE 35) and Motion For Leave To Exceed Page Limitation (DE 42), and Plaintiff Eldrick "Tiger" Woods, Privacy Ltd., and Elin Nordegren Woods' Motion For Leave To File Sur-Reply (DE 46) and Motion For Hearing On Motion To Dismiss (DE 66). The Court has carefully reviewed the instant Motions and the entire court file and is otherwise fully advised in the premises.

I. Background

The above-styled cause was commenced with the filing of a Complaint (DE 1) by Plaintiffs Eldrick "Tiger" Woods (hereinafter "Woods") and Privacy Ltd. alleging a breach of contract claim and a violation of Florida Statutes § 540.08 by Defendant Christensen Shipyards, Ltd. (hereinafter "Christensen"). Plaintiffs allege that Christensen engaged in the unauthorized use of Woods' name and likeness, and photographs of Privacy Ltd.'s yacht, "Privacy," (hereinafter "the Yacht") in violation of the Contract pursuant to which Privacy Ltd. purchased the Yacht from Christensen (hereinafter "the Contract") and in violation of Florida Statutes § 540.08 . Woods is an internationally recognized sports figure who, as the beneficiary of the Heywood Trust, is the sole shareholder of Privacy Ltd. Privacy Ltd. is a Cayman Islands corporation that purchased the Yacht from Christensen. Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint (DE 26) on November 23, 2004, in which Elin Nordegren Woods (hereinafter "Elin Woods") joined the above-styled cause as a plaintiff and Carol Williamson & Associates, Ltd. was added as a defendant.

On November 8, 2004, a hearing (DE 12) was held on Plaintiffs' Motion For A Temporary Injunction (DE 2) during which the parties agreed to the entry of the Consent Preliminary Injunction (DE 9). In the Injunction (DE 13), the parties agreed that Christensen would be "enjoined from making any disclosures prohibited by the February 6, 2004 contract between Privacy Ltd. and Christensen Shipyards, Ltd. " DE 9, p. 4. Additionally, the parties agreed that "[n]othing shall prohibit any party from seeking modification of this Order upon notice to all parties. The parties reserve all of their other respective rights with respect to prosecution or defense of this action including, without limitation, any argument Defendant may have regarding whether venue should be transferred to another forum." Id.

Christensen filed the instant Motion (DE 35) on December 8, 2004, seeking to have the aforementioned Preliminary Injunction (DE 13) dissolved and the above-styled cause dismissed for improper venue citing a forum selection clause of the Contract. In its Response (DE 40), Plaintiffs state that Christensen sets forth the wrong standard by which the clause is to be construed and that Christensen waived its rights to invoke said clause. Additionally, Plaintiffs state that said clause is not mandatory, is unreasonable, and does not cover tort and statutory claims. In Reply (DE 43), Christensen asserts that there has been no waiver of its right to enforce the forum selection clause as evinced in the language of the Consent Preliminary Injunction (DE 13, p. 4) and that based on contract principles, said clause should be enforced and the above-styled cause should be dismissed. On February 4, 2005, the Court entered an Order (DE 54) directing the parties to file additional memoranda on the issue of whether under Washington state law and in Washington state court Plaintiffs Woods and Privacy Ltd. would be afforded a remedy.

II. Standard of Review

The instant Motion (DE 35) is a motion to dismiss based on a forum-selection clause and accordingly will be governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3) as a motion to dismiss for improper venue. Lipcon v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 148 F.3d 1285, 1289-90 (11th Cir. 1998). Accordingly, the Court will consider facts outside the complaint and "resolve all factual conflicts in favor of the plaintiffs." Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, 5B Federal Practice and Procedure § 1352, p. 324 (3d ed. 2004).

With this standard as its guide, the Court will address the various issues raised by the instant Motion (DE 35). First, the Court will determine whether Christensen waived its right to enforce the Contract's forum selection clause thereby mooting the instant Motion (DE 35). Second, the Court will address the relationship of each of the Plaintiffs to the Contract determining which Plaintiffs may be bound by the forum selection clause. Third, the Court will turn to the forum selection clause itself and address, in turn, the clause under contract interpretation principles, its applicability to the tort claims asserted in the Amended Complaint (DE 26), and the central issue of its enforceability. Finally, based on the aforementioned analysis the Court will determine whether Christensen's instant Motion (DE 35) should be granted or denied.

III. Waiver

Plaintiffs assert that Christensen waived its right to seek dismissal for improper venue because it entered into the Consent Preliminary Injunction (DE 9) and stated at the hearing (DE 12) that it agreed to abide by the terms of the injunction "until final resolution of the matter." DE 40, p. 9. Plaintiffs further state the negotiation and entry of a joint scheduling order by the parties and Christensen's counsel's assurance that the above-styled cause would be ready to proceed to trial in six months (DE 25) are additional examples of waiver. Finally, Plaintiffs state the reservation of rights in the Consent Preliminary Injunction only spoke in terms of transferring to another forum, not "seek[ing] dismissal based upon improper venue." DE 40, p. 10. In its Response (DE 43), Christensen responds it did not act implicitly or explicitly in a manner which would constitute a waiver, and the Consent Preliminary Injunction preserved other rights "without limitation" to the rights specifically listed in the said Injunction. DE 43, p. 6.

In order for a waiver to exist, an individual must possess a right, have knowledge of said right, and act in a way that "is inconsistent with the right or his intention to rely upon the right." Weisbart & Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 568 F.2d 391, 396 (5th Cir. 1978). See Spokane County v. Specialty Auto and Truck Painting, Inc., 153 Wn.2d 238, 103 P.3d 792, 796 (Wash. 2004). 2 Waiver may be explicit if a party makes a specific statement of his intent to waive a right, or it may be implied through conduct and such conduct "must make out a clear case." Air Prods. and Chems., Inc. v. La. Land and Exploration Co., 867 F.2d 1376, 1379 (11th Cir. 1989) (citations omitted). "Further, to constitute a waiver, other than by express agreement, there must be unequivocal acts or conduct evincing an intent to waive. Intent cannot be inferred from doubtful and ambiguous factors." Wagner v. Wagner, 95 Wn.2d 94, 621 P.2d 1279, 1284 (Wash. 1980) (citations omitted). Finally, waiver does not exist when one waits a reasonable time to attempt to enforce a right. Garfinkle v. Dooley, 672 F.2d 1340, 1347 (11th Cir. 1982).

FOOTNOTES

1 Decisions by the former Fifth Circuit issued before October 1, 1981, are binding as precedent in the Eleventh Circuit. See Bonner v. City of Prichard, Ala., 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).

The forum selection clause of the Contract states that the Contract shall be governed by Washington law. See DE 57, § 18.11(g). Accordingly, the Court will cite Washington law in this order where appropriate.

The Court finds that based on the applicable standard and the facts of the above-styled cause, Christensen has not waived its right to enforce the forum selection clause of the Contract. Christensen was aware of the clause as envinced by the instant Motion (DE 35) as well as the reservation of rights language set forth in the Consent Preliminary Injunction (DE 9). Said language states that "[t]he parties reserve all of their other respective rights with respect to prosecution or defense of this action, including, without, limitation any argument Defendant may have regarding whether venue should be transferred to another forum." DE 9, P 2. This statement is a clear and explicit preservation of rights, and the Court rejects Plaintiffs's contention that such a preservation relates only to the transfer rather than the to the dismissal of the above-styled cause. The language of the aforementioned paragraph specifically states, "including, without limitation," and accordingly the Court finds that Christensen did not preserve solely the right to transfer the above-styled cause. In addition, while Christensen waited a month and a half after entering into the Consent Preliminary Injunction before filing the instant Motion (DE 35), the Court finds that the passage of such time is minimal and reasonable and does not constitute waiver. Further, the Court finds that Christensen's acts of entering a Joint Scheduling Report (DE 25) and of stating that it would be ready for trial in six months do not constitute conduct evincing waiver. Both of these acts by Christensen were conducted at the specific request of the Court. See DE 40, Ex. D, pp. 3, 7. Accordingly, the Court finds that Christensen has not waived its right to seek enforcement of the forum selection clause of the Contract.

IV. Parties and the Contract

There are three Plaintiffs in the above-styled cause, all of which have asserted claims against Christensen. In the instant Motion (DE 35), Christensen seeks to enforce the forum selection clause against all three Plaintiffs and to be dismissed from the above-styled cause. Plaintiffs concede that Privacy is bound by the forum selection clause, but contend that Woods and Elin Woods are not so bound. In order to determine whether a particular Plaintiff is bound by the forum selection clause, the Court will review some general, governing contract principles, the terms of the Contract, and each individual Plaintiff's relationship, if any, to the Contract and the forum selection clause.

A contract can only be enforced against those who are party to it. McIntyre v. Johnson, 66 Wash. 567, 120 P. 92, 94 (Wash. 1912). See E.E.O.C. v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 294, 122 S. Ct. 754, 151 L. Ed. 2d 755 (2002) ("It goes without saying that a contract cannot bind a nonparty"). However if a third party beneficiary seeks to invoke the benefits of a contract, that beneficiary "cannot accept the benefits and avoid the burdens or limitations of the contract." Acciai Speciali Terni USA, Inc. v. M/V Berane, 181 F. Supp. 2d 458, 464-65 (D. Md. 2002) (citations omitted). A third party beneficiary is one to whom the contracting parties intended to create a direct obligation, and not merely benefit. Donald B. Murphy Contractors, Inc. v. King County, 112 Wn. App. 192, 49 P.3d 912, 914 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002) (citations omitted). That is, a third party beneficiary exists "when performance under the contract would necessarily and directly benefit" the party, and the intent of the parties to benefit that party is determined by construing the contract as a whole. Postlewait Constr., Inc. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 106 Wn.2d 96, 720 P.2d 805, 807 (Wash. 1986).

Turning first to the Contract, it sets forth in § 18.5 that, [Christensen] shall not disclose the name of the Motor Yacht or the identity of the Customer's principal [i.e., Woods] or any member of his family for any purpose . . . If [Christensen] breaches the requirements of this subparagraph, it shall be liable to Customer and Customer's principal (who shall be deemed a third party beneficiary of this subparagraph) . . .

DE 57, § 18.5. Later the Contract sets forth a forum selection clause which is at issue in the instant Motion. Id. at § 18.11(g). Section 18.11(g) states,

. . . Except as noted in the arbitration provisions above, if any suit or action is filed by any party to enforce this Agreement or in connection with the subject matter of this Agreement, venue for such suit or action shall be in the Superior Court for Clark County, Washington. Each party hereby consents to and submits to the jurisdiction of the forum of Clark County, Washington . . .

Id. After a review of these two provisions and the Contract as a whole, the Court finds that the parties to the Contract, Privacy and Christensen, intended to create third party beneficiaries to the Contract and did so by the direct conferral of benefits on Privacy's principal, namely Woods, and Woods' family. The benefit, among others, intended to be conferred upon Woods and his family was the non-disclosure of their identities. See id. at § 18.5. However, the above-cited language from the Contract limits Christensen's liability for breach of the Contract to Privacy and Woods alone.

With regard to the forum selection clause, its language establishes its applicability to "any party" who seeks to enforce the terms of the agreement. Id. at § 18.11(g) (emphasis added). The aforementioned clause does not distinguish to which parties it applies. Further, the clause is broad in the sense that it applies to the enforcement of the Contract and any suit connected with the "subject matter" of the Contract. Due to presence of the adjective "any" and the broad coverage of the clause itself, the Court finds that the parties intended the forum selection clause to cover anyone, whether an original contracting party or a third party, who brings a suit under or related to the Contract.

Turning now to the individual Plaintiffs in the above-styled cause: Privacy, Woods, and Elin Woods, the Court will address the individual Plaintiffs, their claims, and their relationship to the forum selection clause. In the Amended Complaint (DE 26), Privacy sets forth a claim for breach of the Contract. Privacy was a party to the Contract. As a result, Privacy is entitled to enforce the terms of the Contract, and similarly, is bound by the terms of the Contract, including, but not limited to the forum selection clause. Therefore, if the forum selection clause is enforceable, it may be enforced against Privacy.

Woods also sets forth a claim for breach of the Contract in the Amended Complaint (DE 26). As previously mentioned, Woods, as the sole beneficiary of the Heywood Trust, is the principal of Privacy. By virtue of his status as Privacy's principal, Woods is a third party beneficiary of the Contract as evinced by the parties' intent to bestow benefits upon the "Customer's principal" and explicit designation as such. See DE 57, § 18.5 ("[I]t shall be liable to Customer and Customer's principal (who shall be deemed a third party beneficiary of this subparagraph)"). Since Woods is a third party beneficiary who is seeking to enforce his rights under the Contract, Woods is bound by the forum selection clause. Therefore, if the forum selection clause is enforceable, it may also be enforced against Woods.

In the Amended Complaint (DE 26), Elin Woods does not assert any claim under the Contract, but sets forth statutory and common law tort claims. While, Elin Woods arguably is a third party beneficiary under the Contract because she is Woods' family member, she is not invoking any benefits under the Contract and therefore cannot be held bound by any of the burdens of the Contract, namely the forum selection clause. Only insofar as she was seeking to recover benefits under the Contract or if she was a signatory to the Contract would she be bound to the terms of the Contract. However, Elin Woods is not seeking to enforce the Contract and is not a signatory to the Contract. In addition, the events that gave rise to her claims against Christensen did not result from a decision on the part of Woods or Privacy, but rather from the actions of Christensen. Elin Woods' interests are not directly related to and do not rely upon Woods' or Privacy's interests, but rather are independent and solely rest in her. In other words, Elin Woods is asserting tort claims on her status which she herself possesses independent of her husband and the Contract between Privacy and Christensen. See Lipcon v. Underwriters At Lloyd's, London, 148 F.3d 1285, 1299 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding that "the interests of the spouses . . . [were] completely derivative of those of the Name plaintiffs -- and thus 'directly related to, if not predicated upon' the interests of the Name plaintiffs . . . [and therefore] the spouses [were] bound by the choice clauses). The Court finds that it cannot bind a non-party to a contract, regardless of whether the individual is a third-party beneficiary, when that party is not invoking any rights under or derivative of said contract. Therefore, the Court finds that Elin Woods cannot be held bound by the forum selection clause of the Contract in the above-styled cause.

V. Forum-Selection Clause

A. Contract Interpretation: Permissive or Mandatory

Turning now to the Contract clause which Christensen seeks to enforce in support of the instant Motion (DE 35), the Court notes that "[i]t is a venerable principle of contract law that the provisions of a contract should be construed so as to give every provision meaning." Fla. Polk County v. Prison Health Servs., 170 F.3d 1081, 1084 (11th Cir. 1999). A forum selection clause may be permissive or mandatory, though such a label is not inherently decisive as to the enforceability of a clause. Snapper, Inc. v. Redan, 171 F.3d 1249, 1262 n. 24 (11th Cir. 1999). If permissive, the clause "authorizes jurisdiction in a designated forum but does not prohibit litigation elsewhere." Global Satellite Commun. Co. v. Starmill U.K. LTD, 378 F.3d 1269, 1272 (11th Cir. 2004). A mandatory clause, on the other hand, contains specific language "such that it dictates an exclusive forum for litigation under the contract." Snapper, 171 F.3d at 1262 n.24.

The clause at issue in the above-styled cause provides:

. . . Except, as noted in the arbitration provision above, if any suit or action is filed by any party to enforce this Agreement or in connection with the subject matter of this Agreement, venue for such suit or action shall be in the Superior Court for Clark County, Washington. Each party hereby consents to and submits to the jurisdiction of the forum of Clark County, Washington, and agrees to be bound by the orders and decisions of such court.

DE 57, § 18.11(g). The Court finds that said clause is mandatory, in other words, that the words of the clause "dictate an exclusive forum for litigation." Snapper, 171 F.3d at 1262 n.24. The clause sets forth a specific location, namely Clark County, Washington, and a specific court within said county, namely the Superior Court. In addition, the clause uses the imperative "shall" when addressing venue in stating that "venue for such suit or action shall be in the Superior Court." DE 57, § 18.11(g) (emphasis added). See Global Satellite Commun. Co., 378 F.3d at 1272 (interpreting "[v]enue shall be in Broward County" "to mandate venue in Broward County, and Broward County alone"). The Court finds that there is no ambiguity as to the exclusivity of the venue clause. While the Court finds that venue clause of the Contract is mandatory, whether it is enforceable in the above-styled cause can only be determined after addressing the appropriate standard for the enforcement of such clauses as set forth below.

B. Torts

In the Amended Complaint (DE 26), Woods asserts several tort claims in the Amended Complaint namely a claim pursuant to Florida Statutes § 540.08 and claims pursuant to Florida's common law right of publicity. Plaintiffs assert that in order for the forum selection clause to cover the tort claims, those claims must depend on the existence and interpretation of the Contract. DE 40, p. 17. Christensen responds that an interpretation of the Contract is required to resolve all of the Plaintiffs tort claims and therefore the tort claims are covered by the forum selection clause. DE 43, 11.

In determining whether a choice of forum and choice of law clause govern tort claims, a Court must examine the scope of the contractual clause at issue. See Green Leaf Nursery v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours and Co., 341 F.3d 1292, 1300-01 (11th Cir. 2003) and Terra Int'l v. Mississippi Chem. Corp., 119 F.3d 688, 692-93 (8th Cir. 1997). The clause in the above-styled cause states that "if any suit or action is filed by any party to enforce this Agreement or in connection with the subject matter of this Agreement, venue for such suit or action shall be in the Superior Court for Clark County, Washington." DE 57, § 18.11(g) (emphasis added). The Court finds that the scope of this clause is broad. It does not just relate to the "construction" aspects of the Contract as Plaintiffs contend (DE 40), but rather covers the enforcement of any provision of the Contract, including the provisions regarding the usage of photographs, names, and likenesses. DE 57, §§ 18.4 and 18.5. Further, the scope of the forum selection clause encompasses any claims that are connected with the "subject matter" of the Contract. The Contract regulates the use of photos, names, and likenesses of the Yacht and Woods. Id. Therefore, the Court finds that any allegations of the misuse of the photos, names, and likenesses of the Yacht and Woods, and any suit that arises therefrom is connected with the subject matter of the Contract. See Marinechance Shipping, Ltd. v. Sebastian, 143 F.3d 216, 222-23 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that even if a forum selection clause in employment contract did not apply to tort claims, said claims were subject to a forum selection clause in a revised contract that was incorporated into the employment and applied to "any and all disputes or controversies" arising out of the contract); see also Hugel v. Corp. of Lloyd's, 999 F.2d 206, 209 (7th Cir. 1993).

Further, the contractual and tort claims, whether common law or statutory, involving the same operative facts "should be heard in the forum selected by the contracting parties." Terra Internat'l Inc, 119 F.3d at 694 (quoting Lambert v. Kysar, 983 F.2d 1110, 1121-22 (1st Cir. 1993)). Plaintiffs allege the same facts for the breach of contract claim and tort claims. Finally, the tort claims are only valid if the disclosures were unauthorized. The Contract provides for disclosure in particular instances and under certain circumstances. See DE 57, §§ 18.4 and 18.5. Therefore, an interpretation of the Contract is required to determine whether the disclosures were permitted under the Contract thereby precluding the tort claims. See Manetti-Farrow, Inc. v. Gucci America, Inc., 858 F.2d 509, 514 (9th Cir. 1988). Accordingly, the Court finds that the tort claims are covered by the forum selection clause of the Contract.

C. Enforceability

In determining whether a forum selection clause is enforceable in a case over which the Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332, i.e. diversity, the district court should determine whether a federal statute covers the dispute in question. Stewart Org. v. Ricoh, Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 27, 108 S. Ct. 2239, 101 L. Ed. 2d 22. If the answer to that initial question is in the affirmative, then the district court is to determine whether the statute is a valid exercise of Congress' authority under the Constitution, and if so, then the district court is free to apply the statute to the case at hand. Id., n. 6 (1988). If, however, the answer to the initial question is in the negative, since "[v]enue is a matter of federal procedure," "[u]nder Hanna, federal law, not [state] law, must be applied to determine the effect of a forum selection clause." Stewart Org. v. Ricoh Corp., 810 F.2d 1066, 1068 (11th Cir. 1987), aff'd on other grounds, 487 U.S. 22, 108 S. Ct. 2239, 101 L. Ed. 2d 22 (1988).

In the above-styled cause, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3) is the only federal statute that is pertinent to the instant Motion (DE 35). A review of Rule 12(b) (3) reveals that it merely provides for dismissal of an action for improper venue and does not provide any criterion on which to determine the propriety of said dismissal, let alone the enforceability of a forum selection clause. Further, the Court does not address the enforceability of the forum selection clause based on 28 U.S.C. § 1404 as done by the United States Supreme Court in Stewart because the instant Motion is a Motion To Dismiss and not a motion to transfer venue. In addition, the forum selection clause at issue sets forth a state court and not a federal court, and accordingly the Court finds that there is no federal statute that governs the instant Motion (DE 35). See Int'l Software Sys. v. Amplicon, Inc., 77 F.3d 112, 115 (5th Cir. 1996). Therefore, the Court will look to the federal law governing the enforceability of forum selection clauses, namely the standard set forth by the Supreme Court in M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 92 S. Ct. 1907, 32 L. Ed. 2d 513 (1972) and employed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in Lipcon v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 148 F.3d 1285 (11th Cir. 1998). In Bremen, the Supreme Court

did not define precisely the circumstances that would make it unreasonable for a court to enforce a forum clause. Instead, the Court discussed a number of factors that made it reasonable to enforce the clause at issue in The Bremen and that, presumably, would be pertinent in any determination whether to enforce a similar clause.

Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 592, 111 S. Ct. 1522, 113 L. Ed. 2d 622 (1991). Therefore, the Court will review the forum selection clause and deem it

unenforceable [if]: (1) [its] formation was induced by fraud or overreaching; (2) the plaintiff effectively would be deprived of its day in court because of the inconvenience or unfairness of the chosen forum; (3) the fundamental unfairness of the chosen law would deprive the plaintiff of a remedy; or (4) enforcement of such provisions would contravene a strong public policy.

Lipcon v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, 148 F.3d 1285, 1296 (11th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted). In addition, the Court will review the circumstances and not enforce the forum selection clause if such "enforcement would be unreasonable and unjust." Bremen, 407 U.S. at 15.

1. Fraud

First, a forum selection clause induced by fraud will not be enforced. There are no allegations of fraud in the above-styled cause. Further, there are no facts on the record before the Court indicating that the forum selection clause was formed by fraud or overreaching. Therefore, the Court will not address this consideration because it is not at issue in the above-styled cause.

2. Inconvenience

Second, a forum selection clause will not be enforced if the designated forum is inconvenient. Plaintiffs, as "the party claiming [unfairness] . . . bear a heavy burden of proof." Shute, 499 U.S. at 591. In order for a forum to be deemed inconvenient such that it would render a forum selection clause unenforceable, the party "seeking to escape his contract [must] show that trial in the contractual forum will be so gravely difficult and inconvenient that he will for all practical purposes be deprived of his day in court." Bremen, 407 U.S. at 18. The Supreme Court went on to conclude that absent such a showing, "there is no basis for concluding that it would be unfair, unjust, or unreasonable to hold that party to his bargain." Id.

Plaintiffs contend that the Superior Court for Clark County, Washington is inconvenient and falls into a circumstance described by the United States Supreme Court in Bremen. Specifically, Plaintiffs assert that

[w]e are not here dealing with an agreement between two Americans to resolve their essentially local disputes in a remote alien forum. In such case, the serious inconvenience of the contractual forum to one or both of the parties might carry greater weight to determining the reasonableness of the forum clause. The remoteness of the forum might suggest that . . . the parties did not have a particular controversy in mind when they made their agreement . . .

See DE 40, p. 14 (quoting Bremen, 407 U.S. at 17). The Court finds that Plaintiffs' reliance on the passage from Bremen is not representative of the case at hand, and like the Supreme Court in Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 594-95, 111 S. Ct. 1522, 113 L. Ed. 2d 622 (1991), rejects the application. As the Supreme Court stated in Shute, "The [Bremen] Court made this statement in evaluating a hypothetical agreement between 'two Americans to resolve their essentially local disputes in a remote alien forum.'" Just as the Supreme Court in Shute found that Florida was not an alien forum in a suit between Washington residents and Carnival Cruise Lines, this Court, in a converse situation, finds that Washington state is not an alien forum in the above-styled cause between a Florida resident and a Washington corporation. In Bremen, the Supreme Court was addressing the scenario in which two Americans would be required to resolve a dispute in a "remote alien forum." Bremen 407 U.S. at 17 (emphasis added). In the context of a case dealing with a forum selection clause which designated London, England, as the forum, the Supreme Court employed the term "alien" in reference to a foreign nation, not a state within the United States other than the state in which the suit was originally brought. The parties in the above-styled cause freely negotiated the terms of the Contract, including the forum selection clause, and as a result the parties should have anticipated the potential for inconvenience at the time the Contract was executed. See Bremen, 407 U.S. at 17-18.

There are competing assertions from the parties regarding the location of witnesses. With the relative ease of modern travel, such concerns are substantially minimized and therefore do not rise to the level of inconvenience as set forth in Bremen. Accordingly, the Court finds that Washington is not an inconvenient forum, and therefore, the Contract forum selection clause cannot be deemed unenforceable based on the factor of inconvenience.

3. Unfairness of Washington law

Third, a forum selection clause will not be enforced if "the fundamental unfairness of the chosen law would deprive the plaintiff of a remedy." Lipcon, 148 F.3d at 1292. In interpreting the perameters of this factor, the Eleventh Circuit stated that a forum selection clause will be unenforceable "only when the remedies available in the chosen forum are so inadequate that the enforcement would be fundamentally unfair." Lipcon, 148 F.3d at 1297. Forum selection clauses will not be invalidated merely because the remedy in the selected forum in the contract is less favorable to those available in the forum in which the cause of action was originally brought.

In support of this contention, the Eleventh Circuit cited the Second Circuit in Roby v. Corporation of Lloyd's, 996 F.2d 1353, 1360-61 (2d Cir. 1993), which stated that the agreement "must be enforced even if that agreement tacitly includes the forfeiture of some claims that could have been brought in a different forum." Similarly the Eleventh Circuit cited the Tenth Circuit in Riley v. Kingsley Underwriting Agencies, Ltd., 969 F.2d 953, 958 (10th Cir. 1992), which held that "[t]he fact that an international transaction may be subject to laws and remedies different or less favorable than those of the United States is not a valid basis to deny enforcement, provided that the law of the chosen forum is not inherently unfair." The Tenth Circuit in Riley went on to state that the English law did not preclude the plaintiff from "pursuing an action for fraud" and concluded that there was nothing to prevent the enforcement of the forum selection clause.

Plaintiffs state that Washington law does not permit a claim for punitive damages or provide for a common law remedy. See DE 59. While the Court acknowledges that Plaintiffs will be unable to raise all of the claims in Washington state court that it has set forth in the above-styled cause, Washington law does not completely preclude the bringing of a claim for a violation of privacy based on exploitation of publicity. While the causes of action and remedies are different and may be less favorable to Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs would not be entirely precluded from bringing an invasion of privacy claim in Washington state court under Washington law. Compare Wash. Statutes §§ 63.60.010, 63.60.050 with Florida Stat. ch. 540.08. Accordingly, the Court finds that Washington law, while different from Florida law, is not fundamentally unfair and will not deprive Plaintiffs of a remedy, and therefore does not make the forum selection clause unenforceable.

4. Florida Public Policy

Fourth, a forum selection clause will not be enforced if the "enforcement of such provisions would contravene a strong public policy." Lipcon, 148 F.3d at 1292. In addressing the issue of public policy, the Supreme Court in Bremen stated that a forum selection clause should not be enforced "if enforcement would contravene a strong public policy of the forum in which suit is brought whether declared by statute or judicial decision." Bremen, 407 U.S. at 15. In support of this assertion, the Supreme Court cited as an example Boyd v. Grand Trunk W.R. Co., 338 U.S. 263, 70 S. Ct. 26, 94 L. Ed. 55 (1943). In Boyd, the Supreme Court dealt with an action that set forth a claim pursuant to the Federal Employers' Liability Act and a forum selection clause. The Supreme Court determined that the contract in Boyd was void because the Federal Employers' Liability Act specifically set forth the forum in which claims invoked under it might be brought. Similarly in Ricoh, the Eleventh Circuit addressed the public policy prong when deciding whether to enforce a forum selection clause in terms of Alabama court decisions finding forum selection clauses to be violative of Alabama public policy. The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the Alabama position was based upon the protection of the jurisdiction of Alabama state courts and not the adjudication of claims in a federal court located in Alabama, and therefore held that the forum selection clause was not violative of Alabama public policy. Ricoh, 810 F.2d at 1069, 1070. It is worth noting that there is a distinction between a public policy insofar as it relates to substantive protections and as it relates to venue selection, see E & J Gallo Winery v. Morand Bros. Beverage Co., 247 F.Supp.2d 973, 978 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (holding that the Illinois Bear Act's venue provision set forth a public policy making the forum selection clause at issue unenforceable). The Court finds that the public policy of which Bremen speaks in setting forth the public policy prong is any public policy regarding venue of the forum in which the suit was brought.

In the above-styled cause there are state claims, both statutory and common law, that have been raised. Plaintiffs state that Florida Statutes § 540.08 "is rooted in strong public policy of the State of Florida," DE 15, p. 15, and therefore the forum selection clause should not be enforced. In support of this contention, Plaintiffs cite a Florida Fourth District Court of Appeals case, Loft v. Fuller, 408 So.2d 619, 622 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981), which stated that the Florida legislature "amplified the remedies available for the fourth form of invasion of privacy: commercial exploitation of the property value of a person's name or personality." In addition, Plaintiffs cite the availability of punitive damages under the statute which they state are an "important substantive right." Id. (citing Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, 514 U.S. 52, 63, 115 S. Ct. 1212, 131 L. Ed. 2d 76 (1995)).

While there is a showing that the Florida legislature wanted to expand privacy protection and the damages available under those statutory protections, Plaintiffs do not cite either a Florida statute or judicial decision which sets forth the public policy regarding whether such claims must be adjudicated in Florida. The public policy that is specifically of importance in applying the Bremen factors is whether Florida has a public policy as set forth in its statutes or judicial opinions that particular claims should be adjudicated in Florida. While the Florida courts and legislature have arguably set forth a policy regarding the protections that are to be afforded regarding invasion of privacy and the remedies available for violations thereof, neither a Florida court nor legislature has set forth a policy that said protections must be adjudicated in Florida. Therefore, in light of this absence, in the case at issue there is no Florida public policy that would preclude the enforcement of the forum selection clause.

5. Unreasonableness

There is one final and overarching consideration that must be examined by the Court before determining the enforceability of the Contract forum selection clause, namely, whether "the enforcement would be unreasonable and unjust, or that the clause was invalid for such reasons as fraud or overreaching." Bremen, 407 U.S. at 15. As previously stated, fraud is not at issue in the above-styled cause. However, in light of the fact that the Contract forum selection clause applies to Privacy, Ltd. and Woods, but does not apply to Elin Woods, the result of an enforcement of the forum selection clause at issue would be dismissal of Privacy, Ltd.'s and Woods' claims against Christensen and a retention of Elin Woods' claims against Christensen. As a result, Christensen would still be required to litigate Elin Woods' claims in this Court. Assuming then that Privacy, Ltd. and Woods file subsequent claims in the Superior County Court in Washington against Christensen for its actions alleged in the above-styled cause, the result of enforcement of the forum selection clause would be parallel proceedings in different forums on the same set of facts and legal issues. The Court finds that enforcement in light of said considerations would lead to the "unreasonable" and, arguably, "unjust" result of judicial inefficiency and potentially competing judgments. See Mylan Pharms. Inc. v. Am. Safety Razor Co., 265 F. Supp. 2d 635, 639 (N.D. W.Va. 2002) and Nippon Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. M/V Springwave, 92 F. Supp.2d 574, 577 (E.D. La. 2000) (declining to enforce a forum selection clause where the same facts and same legal theories would be litigated against the same party by other parties who were not parties to the forum selection clause); see also Dias v. Mediterranean Shipping Co., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24162, 2003 WL 23190184, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 5, 2003). Therefore for the sake of judicial economy and consistency of judgment, the Court will not enforce the forum selection clause and finds that denial of Christensen's instant Motion (DE 35) is appropriate.

Accordingly, after due consideration, it is

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:

1. Defendant Christensen Shipyards, Ltd. 's Motion To Dismiss For Improper Venue And To Dissolve Consent Preliminary Injunction (DE 35) be and the same is hereby DENIED;

2. Defendant Christensen Shipyards, Ltd. 's Motion For Leave To Exceed Page Limitation (DE 42) be and the same is hereby GRANTED; and

3. Plaintiff Eldrick "Tiger" Woods, Privacy Ltd., and Elin Nordegren Woods' Motion For Leave To File Sur-Reply (DE 46) and Motion For Hearing On Motion To Dismiss (DE 66) be and the same are hereby DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that The Court's prior Order Staying Proceedings (DE 55) dated February 4, 2005, be and the same is hereby VACATED, set aside, and of no further force or effect.

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Fort Lauderdale, Broward County, Florida this 23rd day of September, 2005.

WILLIAM J. ZLOCH

Chief United States District Judge

Loredana Jolie Ferriolo

Real name: LOREDANA F FERRIOLO
Date of Birth:June 11, 1983

Father:

ALBERT FERRIOLO
DOB: 3/4/1953

Mother:

ANTIONETTA FERRIOLO
DOB: 12/25/1952

LOREDANA FERRIOLO

Owner Information
Original Name:	FERRIOLO ANTONIETTA & ALBERTO (OWNER OCCUPIED)
Standardized Name:	FERRIOLO, ALBERTO FERRIOLO, ANTONIETTA
Original Address:	OCEANSIDE, NY 11572 107 MOTT
Standardized Address:	107 MOTT ST OCEANSIDE, NY 11572-5813 NASSAU COUNTY

Property Information
Original Property Address:	OCEANSIDE, NY 11572 107 MOTT ST
Standardized Property Address:	107 MOTT ST OCEANSIDE, NY 11572-5813 NASSAU COUNTY
Land Use:	SINGLE FAMILY RESIDENTIAL

Legal Information
Assessor's Parcel Number:	43-192-00-0203
Recording Date:	01/12/2005
Book/Page:	11899/523
Brief Description:	TOWN #1 SCH DIST 011
Legal Description:	LOT NUMBER: 203-205; BLOCK: 192; SECTION: 43; DISTRICT: 282089; CITY/MUNI/TWNSP: HEMPSTEAD UNINCORPORATED
Lot Description:	MULTIPLE LOTS

Sale Information
Recording Date:	01/12/2005

Assessment Information
Market Value Year:	2007
Market Land Value:	$258,590
Market Improvement Value:	$181,710
Total Market Value:	$440,300
Assessment Year:	2008
Assessed Land Value:	$646
Assessed Improvement Value:	$454
Total Assessed Value:	$1,100

Tax Information
Tax Exemption(s):	MISCELLANEOUS

Property Characteristics
Year Built:	1957
Units:	1
Baths:	1
Partial Baths:	1
Total Rooms:	6
Roof:	SHINGLE (NOT WOOD)
Garage Type:	UNDERGROUND/BASEMENT
Garage Size:	1 CAR(S)
Building Area:	1,150 LIVING
Heating:	HOT WATER
Construction:	FRAME
Basement:	IMPROVED
Exterior Walls:	SIDING (ALUM/VINYL)
Foundation:	CONCRETE
Square Footage:	7079 SF

Sister:

ANGELA FERRIOLA
DOB: 7/1/1974

133 DAVISON AVE, OCEANSIDE NY 11572

Business Information
Filing Number:	10126534
Name:	LOREDANA LLC
Name Type:	LEGAL
standard business address:	17517 Y ST OMAHA, NE 68135-2868
original business address:	17517 Y STREET OMAHA NE 68135 0
Business Type:	DOMESTIC L L C
Status:	ACTIVE
Place Incorporated:	NEBRASKA
Date Incorporated:	08/24/2009
Terms:	PERPETUAL

Registered Agent
Name:	BANNER, MICHAEL
registered agent address	4089 S 84TH ST # 160 OMAHA, NE 68127-1701

Name	Date(s)	Standardized Address	Original Address
LOREDANA FERRIOLO Title: MEMBER Contact Type: MEMBER/MANAGER Effective Date: 08/24/2009		Type: CONTACT 107 MOTT ST OCEANSIDE, NY 11572	107 MOTT STREET OCEANSIDE, 11572

From Google News.......

Playboy model shopping tell all Tiger Woods book with tales of gay sex

The Province - ‎1 hour ago‎

A Playboy model identified in December as one of Tiger Woods's mistresses is planning a tell all book that includes tales of gay sex. ...

Tell-all: Alleged mistress Loredana Jolie Ferriolo claims Tiger Woods had gay ... New York Daily News

Playboy model's tell-all book to focus on Tiger Woods' sexual habits Vancouver Sun

Tiger Woods' Paramour Writing a Tell-All Book HoopsWorld

FOXNews (blog) - The Money Times

Licensee Information
Name:	HAMBLETON, SCOTT LEWIS
Original Name:	HAMBLETON, SCOTT LEWIS
Company Name:	PINE GROVE BEHAVIORAL HEALTH
Standardized Address:	2255 BROADWAY DR HATTIESBURG, MS 39402-3254 FORREST COUNTY
Original Address:	2255 BROADWAY DR HATTIESBURG, MS 394023213
Date of Birth:	04/1963
Gender:	M
Race:	Unknown

License Information
Profession or Board:	PHYSICIAN AND SURGEON OR OSTEOPATH
License Type:	PHYSICIAN AND SURGEON OR OSTEOPATH
License Number:	200000444
Issued Date:	06/02/2004
License Expiration Date:	02/15/2008
Status:	ACTIVE

Disciplinary Actions
Disciplinary Action:	MINUTES TENNESSEE BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS MAY 20 AND 21, 2003; THE NORTH CAROLINA MEDICAL BOARD DISCIPLINED DR. HAMBLETON'S LICENSE ON DECEMBER 10, 2002.
Violation Date:	05/20/2003

Healthcare Sanction Information
Name:	HAMBLETON, SCOTT LEWIS
Address:	ATLANTA, GA
DOB:	04/1963
Tax ID:	562060055
UPIN:	G51422
Sanction Type:	OTHER
Provider Type:	MEDICAL DOCTOR
Sanction Reason:	FAILED TO SATISFY THE BD OF HIS QUALIFICATIONS IN THAT HE IS UNABLE TO PRACTICE WITH REASONABLE SKILL AND SAFETY BY REASON OF ILLNESS, EXCESSIVE USE OF DRUGS, OR MENTAL ABNORMALITY.
License Number:	2000-00444
Sanction State:	North Carolina
Sanction Date:	04/25/2006
Loss Of License:	NO
Fraud Abuse:	NO

Healthcare Sanction Information
Name:	HAMBLETON, SCOTT LEWIS
Address:	SHELBY, NC
DOB:	04/1963
Tax ID:	562060055
UPIN:	G51422
Sanction Type:	SUSPENSION
Provider Type:	MEDICAL DOCTOR
Sanction Reason:	HISTORY OF SUBSTANCE ABUSE; IN VIOLATION OF PREVIOUS CONSENT ORDER BY INGESTING HYDROCODONE
License Number:	2000-00444
Sanction State:	North Carolina
Sanction Date:	06/02/2004
Loss Of License:	NO
Fraud Abuse:	NO

Licensee Information
Name:	HAMBLETON, SCOTT LEWIS
Original Name:	HAMBLETON, SCOTT LEWIS
Date of Birth:	04/1963
Gender:	M
Race:	Unknown

License Information
Profession or Board:	PHYSICIAN AND SURGEON OR OSTEOPATH
License Type:	PHYSICIAN AND SURGEON OR OSTEOPATH
License Number:	2000-00444
Issued Date:	12/10/2002
License Expiration Date:	06/10/2003
Status:	SUSPENDED

Disciplinary Actions
Disciplinary Action:	NORTH CAROLINA MEDICAL BOARD BOARD ORDERS / CONSENT ORDERS / OTHER BOARD ACTIONS JANUARY - FEBRUARY 2008
Violation Date:	01/17/2008

Licensee Information
Name:	HAMBLETON, SCOTT LEWIS
Standardized Address:	E MOREHEAD DR CHARLOTTE, NC 28203 MECKLENBURG COUNTY
Original Address:	CAROLINAS PHYSICIAN NETWORK C/O CMC EAST MOREHEAD DRIVE CHARLOTTE, NC 28203
Date of Birth:	04/1963
License Information
Profession or Board:	MEDICAL
License Type:	DOCTOR OF MEDICINE
Occupation:	LIMITED BY CONSENT
License Number:	2000-00444
Additional License:	SECONDARY SPECIALTY: EMERGENCY MEDICINE
Issued Date:	03/20/2003
License Expiration Date:	04/15/2003
License Renewal Date:	02/13/2002
Status:	INACTIVE - SURRENDERED
Practice Setting:	FAMILY PRACTICE

Education
School Attended:	UNIV OF TN (TN)

Registrant Information
Name:	HAMBLETON, SCOTT L
Residential Address:	2021 SABLEWOOD DR CHARLOTTE, NC 28205-3670 MECKLENBURG COUNTY
Mailing Address:	CHARLOTTE, NC 28205 MECKLENBURG COUNTY
SSN:	217-86-XXXX
Date of Birth:	1963
Age:	41-66
Gender:	Male
Place of Birth:	DC

Voter Information
Registration Date:	10/13/2000
Last Vote Date:	11/5/2002
Party Affiliation:	REPUBLICAN
Active Status:	ACTIVE
Status:	VERIFIED
County:	60
School:	4
Special District 2:	60
Ward:	1
State House District:	102
State Senate District:	003
U.S. House District:	000
Community College District:	4
Municipal:	CLT
Superior Court:	26B
General Election 2002:	VOTED

Tiger Woods rehab facility director Patrick Carnes appointee who has had these
health care sanctions:

"HISTORY OF SUBSTANCE ABUSE; IN VIOLATION OF PREVIOUS CONSENT ORDER BY INGESTING HYDROCODONE"

"FAILED TO SATISFY THE BD OF HIS QUALIFICATIONS IN THAT HE IS UNABLE TO PRACTICE WITH REASONABLE SKILL AND SAFETY BY REASON OF ILLNESS, EXCESSIVE USE OF DRUGS, OR MENTAL ABNORMALITY"

One year before appointment, read the letter 2006 from the North Carolina Medical Board that, " your application for licensure based on your previous acts
of unprofessional conduct and substance abuse"

From page two of the rehab facilities newsletter

Scott Hambleton, MD treatment Addictionologist
Newly appointed Addictionologist
at the Pine Grove Women’s Center. Dr Hambleton is Board Certified
in Family Medicine
and Addiction Medicine.
He is a Diplomate in the
American Society of Addiction Medicine.
Dr Hambleton completed the University
of Florida Addiction Medicine
Fellowship at Pine Grove in 2007.

SLEDGE, CHARLES CHAPMAN Live link to State of Mississipppi Medical Board
PINE GROVE BEHAVIORAL HEALTH

2255 BROADWAY DR
HATTIESBURG, MS 39402

Healthcare Sanction Information
Name:	SLEDGE, CHARLES CHAPMAN
Address:	TUPELO, MS
DOB:	05/1957
UPIN:	B66201
Sanction Type:	OTHER
Provider Type:	MEDICAL DOCTOR
Sanction Reason:	GRANTED PERMISSION TO REREGISTER FOR SCHED IV OF HIS CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES REGISTRATION CERTIFICATE; RETAINS PRIVILEGES IN SCHED V, EXCEPT FOR BUPRENEX; CANNOT PRESCRIBE STADOL AND NUBAIN
License Number:	10339
Sanction State:	Mississippi
Sanction Date:	03/19/1992

Licensee Information
Name:	SLEDGE MD, CHARLES CHAPMAN
Original Name:	SLEDGE, CHARLES CHAPMAN, M.D.
Standardized Address:	2255 BROADWAY DR HATTIESBURG, MS 39402-3254 FORREST COUNTY
Original Address:	PINE GROVE BEHAVIORAL HEALTH 2255 BROADWAY DRIVE HATTIESBURG, MS 39402
Race:	Unknown

License Information
Profession or Board:	MEDICAL
License Type:	PHYSICIAN
License Number:	10339
Issued Date:	07/01/1984
License Expiration Date:	06/30/2006
Practice Setting:	OTHER

Licensee Information
Name:	SLEDGE MD, CHARLES CHAPMAN
Original Name:	SLEDGE, CHARLES CHAPMAN, M.D.
Standardized Address:	2253 BROADWAY DR HATTIESBURG, MS 39402-3254 FORREST COUNTY
Original Address:	2253 BROADWAY DR HATTIESBURG, MS 39402
Race:	Unknown

License Information
Profession or Board:	MEDICAL
License Type:	PHYSICIAN
License Number:	10339
Issued Date:	07/01/1984
License Expiration Date:	06/30/2007
Practice Setting:	PSYCHIATRY, ADDICTION

Names
Name(s):	SLEDGE, CHARLES C SLEDGE, CHARLES CHAPMAN
Gender:	Male

Dates of Birth
DOB(s):	05/1957

Business Addresses
Address:	1101B S 28TH AVE STE 1 HATTIESBURG, MS 39402-2610
Phone Number(s):	601-288-4900 (Office Phone) 601-288-8050 (Office Phone)

Address:	1611 S 28TH AVE HATTIESBURG, MS 39402-3110
Phone Number(s):	601-288-7000 (Office Phone)

Address:	2255 BROADWAY DR HATTIESBURG, MS 39402-3254
Phone Number(s):	601-288-8050 (Office Phone)

Address:	1 LINCOLN PKWY STE 202 HATTIESBURG, MS 39402-3261
Phone Number(s):	601-288-8050 (Office Phone)

Address:	1 PROFESSIONAL PKWY HATTIESBURG, MS 39402-2637
Phone Number(s):	601-288-8050 (Office Phone)

Address:	2253 BROADWAY DR HATTIESBURG, MS 39402-3254

Address:	1 LINCOLN PKWY HATTIESBURG, MS 39402-3262
Phone Number(s):	601-288-8050 (Office Phone)

Address:	8283 RIVER ROAD PIKE NASHVILLE, TN 37209-6018
Phone Number(s):	615-352-1757 (Office Phone)

Address:	PINE GROVE NEXT STEP HATTIESBURG, MS 39402

Licenses
License Number:	45351
License State:	Tennessee

License Number:	10339
License State:	Mississippi

License Number:	10339
License State:	Mississippi
Expiration Date:	06/30/2006
Effective Date:	07/01/1984

License Number:	10339
License State:	Mississippi
Expiration Date:	06/30/2007
Effective Date:	07/01/1984

Specialties
Specialty Name(s):	ADDICTIONOLOGY ELECTRODIAGNOSTIC MEDICINE PSYCHIATRIST PSYCHIATRY

IDs
Tax ID(s):	640714664 581965168 646001587
UPIN(s):	B66201

Education
Degree(s):	MD

Affiliations
Group Affiliation(s):	Anita Charlene Fairchild Charles Duane Burgess Deborah Virginia Gross Diana R Mesrobian Donna Dimarco Tomlinson Edward Michael Anderson Eye Consultants of Atlanta PC FORREST COUNTY GENERAL HOSPITAL Geralyn Datz Jennifer G Trihoulis Joanna Michelle Hardy John Murrell McRae Kenneth D McGill Larry G Ray Leah Claire Bennett Randall L Sherman Regina A Williams Rose Ellen Skrmetti Shelley S Cochran SOUTH MISSISSIPPI HEALTH SERVICE, INC

Licensee Information
Name:	SLEDGE MD, CHARLES CHAPMAN
Original Name:	SLEDGE, CHARLES CHAPMAN, M.D.
Standardized Address:	2253 BROADWAY DR